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Integrating Informal Institutions in Local Governance: Does it Matter?  
 
Shandana Khan Mohmand and Snezana Misic Mihajlović 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this paper we add to the literature on ‘informally institutionalised’ relationships between 
states and citizens by examining the case of a particular type of informal institution – Mjesna 
Zajednica (MZ) – that operates across the countries of the former Yugoslavia. We use a 
mixed method approach to explore variation in the role and functions of MZs in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and use institutional variation across two parts of the country to test the claim 
that there is a relationship between strong legal frameworks and the role of MZs in 
strengthening citizen participation, inclusive decision-making, and improved service delivery. 
Specifically, we ask whether legal status and the formal inclusion of informal institutions of 
citizen participation in local government processes make a difference to local governance, 
especially in terms of citizen participation and service delivery. We find evidence to suggest 
that bringing government closer to the people through the inclusion of local institutions in 
formal local government appears to matter for improved governance, especially in terms of 
citizen participation and service delivery.  
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1 Introduction 
There is growing literature on the fact that the relationship between the state and citizens in 
many parts of the world may be ‘informally institutionalised’ (O’Donnell 1996), in that it 
operates through actors and institutions that lie wholly or partly outside formal state 
procedures and structures. In some cases these actors are brokers and intermediaries that 
connect citizens with the state (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno 
and Brusco 2013), in other cases these are ‘hybrid arrangements’ that incorporate actors and 
institutions outside the state into state procedures (Meagher, De Herdt and Titeca 2014), and 
in yet others these are simply informal ways of doing business within formal state institutions 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2006). While these relationships are certainly not new, the literature on 
them is still limited. We do not fully understand the role that such ‘informal’ institutions play, or 
the ways in which they exercise public authority. Furthermore, our ability to usefully organise 
such actors and institutions into analytically relevant typologies is even more limited. 
However, this is an important task because empirical evidence suggests that such institutions 
have tremendous potential to strengthen citizen participation, encourage inclusive decision-
making and promote improved service delivery at the local level (Ananth Pur 2004; Ananth 
Pur and Moore 2010; Cheema, Mohmand and Naqvi 2007; Mohmand and Misic Mihajlović 
2014).  
In this paper we seek to add to the literature by examining the case of a particular type of 
informal local governance institution – Mjesna Zajednica (MZ) – that operates across the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia. Studies of local governance in the Western Balkan 
countries indicate that MZs are a traditional form of sub-municipal self-government that play 
an important role in local development (Blanuša and Grbić 2011; Krizanic 2008; Mohmand 
and Misic Mihajlović 2014; Stojanovic and Bajrovic 2008). In this paper we use a mixed 
method approach to nuance this literature by exploring variation in the role and functions of 
MZs. We do this specifically in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and use institutional 
variation across two parts of the country  the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)  to test the claim that there is a relationship between strong 
legal frameworks and the role of MZs in strengthening citizen participation, inclusive 
decision-making, and improved service delivery. 
Our analysis draws on three sets of literature. First, it draws on literature on decentralisation. 
The claim that decentralisation leads in some intrinsic and automatic way to greater citizen 
participation in local decision-making processes because it brings government closer to the 
people is now somewhat disputed (Faguet 2012, 2014; Treisman 2007). Increasing citizen 
participation in local government, and then bringing this to bear on the magnitude and quality 
of local service delivery, requires a host of social and political preconditions. On the supply 
side it requires sufficient capacity and a strong state with the political will to devolve decision-
making power down to local communities and create more space for citizen participation 
(Fung and Wright 2003; Gaventa 2004; Heller 2001). On the demand side it requires active 
citizenship, sufficient information and the belief that people can make a real difference in the 
way the state works (Goetz and Jenkins 2001; Lieberman, Posner and Tsai 2014). In many 
local communities such citizenship often functions through informal local institutions through 
which citizens participate in state decision-making processes (Casson, Giusta and 
Kambampati 2009; Krishna 2007; Lauth 2000).  
Literature on informal institutions is the second subject area that we engage with in this 
paper. MZs fall within a particular subset of informal institutions that we call informal local 
governance institutions (ILGIs) (Ananth Pur 2004; Mohmand 2016). Such informal institutions 
are well anchored in communities, exercise some level of local public authority, engage 
actively with formal governance processes, and often take on state-like roles and deliver 
services within the community. In many parts of the world such local institutions may lack 
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formal state sanction but they have a fairly institutionalised way of selecting their leaders, 
recruiting and representing members, and working with the state. An important question that 
Helmke and Levitsky (2006) raise about informal institutions in a broader context applies just 
as well to our concern with the MZs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do informal institutions 
substitute and compete with the state, especially when delivering communal services, or do 
they complement the state and help extend its writ over jurisdictions that may otherwise be 
ignored or marginalised within the development process? Scholars like Efendic, Pugh and 
Adnett (2011) argue that in Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘formal institutions and informal 
institutions are substitutes: the success or failure of formal institutions is mirrored by the 
decreasing or increasing role of informal institutions’ (Efendic et al. 2011: 523). This does not, 
however, capture the full reality of MZs and their relationship with the state across the 
Western Balkans, where they often work to complement the public policy outcomes of formal 
institutions (Krizanic 2008).  
The fact that MZs function at the intersection of local formal government and the informal 
aggregation of citizen interests and demands indicates that they must play a role in social 
and political accountability. Literature on social accountability is, therefore, the third type that 
our analysis comments on. This literature tells us that service provision outcomes can be 
improved through informed ‘voice-led’ citizen engagement (Fox 2014); through a strong and 
legitimate representative claim (Saward 2006); through open and organic  as opposed to 
official and invited  spaces for participation (Gaventa 2004; Mansuri and Rao 2013); or by 
empowering citizens through the provision of information about services (Goetz and Jenkins 
2001; Khemani 2007; Lieberman et al. 2014). Led by the claims presented in this literature, 
we can expect that MZs are able to improve service delivery outcomes because they are 
traditional aggregators of citizen voice, they have a strong electoral representative claim, and 
they regularly transmit information about service delivery between the state and local 
communities.  
Our analysis in this paper engages with and furthers each of these three sets of literature. 
The central research question that guides our effort is whether legal status and the formal 
inclusion of informal institutions of citizen participation in local government processes makes 
a difference to local governance, especially in terms of citizen participation and service 
delivery. This is an important question for public policy but one that is difficult to research 
because most political contexts only allow informal institutions to be observed within singular 
institutional frameworks. Comparative analysis across different frameworks leads to 
complications arising from the fact that we are unable to hold differences in the type of 
informal institutions constant. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political context provides us with an 
exciting and unique opportunity to analyse the role of the same informal local governance 
institution, the MZ, operating within two different institutional frameworks. This is because 
MZs have different legal status across the two parts of the country  they are formally 
recognised as a sub-municipal tier of local governance in FBiH, but do not have formal status 
in RS. Exploring MZs, citizen participation and local service delivery in municipalities that lie 
close to one another but on two different sides of the border that separates FBiH and RS, 
allows us to ask with greater accuracy whether their status as a formal or informal institution 
has any correlation with the quality of local governance.   
Overall, we have two main results. We found that where MZs have legal status and a formal 
role in local decision-making processes, citizens use them more to access the state, and 
overall satisfaction with service quality is higher. We also found that, regardless of formal 
status, service delivery in rural parts of both FBiH and RS is almost entirely dependent on the 
initiative of MZs, and that in some areas were it not for the intervention of this local institution, 
there may have been no service provision at all. We are thus able to conclude that bringing 
government closer to the people through the inclusion of local institutions in formal local 
government appears to matter for improved governance, especially in terms of citizen 
participation and service delivery.  
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes MZs in detail, and looks at institutional 
variation across the two parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it applies to MZs. Section 3 
provides details of our research design and empirical strategy, while Section 4 provides an 
integrated discussion of our results and main findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a 
summary of our findings. 
 
2 Mjesna Zajednicas on either side of the Inter-
Entity Boundary Line 
The local institution we analyse in this paper is called Mjesna Zajednica (MZs) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and variants of the name in other parts of the Western Balkans. MZs lie on the 
intersection of the state and the informal organisation of citizens’ interests. They are neither 
wholly formal, nor fully informal. Their structure and functions are defined by formal state 
regulations, and they are legally recognised as fora where citizens can come together to 
discuss issues, decide on strategies, and formulate proposals on issues of local significance. 
At the same time, MZs are not integrated into the structure and work of municipalities and 
they carry out a host of tasks outside their formally defined functions. Krizanic (2008) calls 
them ‘autonomous forms of citizen self-representation’.  
MZs are not entirely organic institutions. They were formally instituted under Yugoslav law in 
the 1963 Constitution to facilitate citizen participation in local governance and decision-
making, but then became informal over time as political changes and the break-up of 
Yugoslavia led to changes in their role. In the phase of centralisation that characterised the 
initial stages of state building in the new states in the early 1990s, MZs were neglected as 
the lowest level of citizen organisation and their powers were transferred to municipalities. 
Their relevance was further reduced by a growing trend of decentralisation that emerged as 
part of the conditions for EU accession in the mid-1990s. Mirroring the political structures of 
their European neighbours, ex-Yugoslav states increased the number of municipalities and 
decreased the average population per municipal territory. As local formal authorities came 
closer to citizens, the sub-municipal level of governance was considered redundant and MZs 
were pushed further out of the formal realm. However, recent rounds of local government 
reforms in the Western Balkans has shifted the focus slowly back to the role that MZs can 
play in connecting the state to its citizens.  
The legal framework in both entities, FBiH and RS, assigns the organisation of citizen 
participation to MZs as their main function. Our interviews, along with other reports and 
public opinion polls, indicate that MZs are the most known and the most used participatory 
mechanism defined by law. According to a survey conducted by the Centres of Civic 
Initiatives (CCI 2012), 74.6 per cent of citizens recognise MZs as the most used participation 
mechanism and 44.5 per cent use MZs to engage in local decision-making. MZs are the 
principal form of ‘neighbourhood governance’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They gather 
citizens around spatial interests that affect their everyday lives and, very importantly, involve 
them in local government decisions and processes aimed at solving problems in their 
localities. MZs deal with a variety of issues, ranging from communal issues (e.g. 
maintenance of street lighting, roads, existing communal infrastructure, provision of new 
services, etc.), to health (e.g. making the schedule for visiting health teams in MZ health 
centres, transport of sick people to hospitals, etc.), to social and humanitarian aid1 (e.g. 
making the lists of people in need, registration of aid received by households, etc.), to 
education (e.g. transportation of children to schools, etc.), as well as a host of other issues. 
                                                          
1  Distribution of humanitarian aid was a burning problem in all municipalities after the heavy floods and landslides in the 
period MaySeptember 2014. 
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In a more informal capacity, MZs also play a role in the monitoring and oversight of public 
service delivery, and sometimes even in setting up and delivering services themselves.  
MZs are led by councils whose members are elected for four-year terms at MZ elections by 
the community, and in accordance with rules set by the municipality in both entities. These 
council members elect MZ presidents for the same period of time, who represent the MZ in 
municipal meetings and in legal and financial matters. The MZ council performs the role of a 
representative body and is accountable to the municipal council.2 Both the president and 
members of the MZ council can be dismissed by the municipality before the end of their 
mandate in accordance with municipal statutes, although local government laws provide 
greater security of tenure to MZs in FBiH than those in RS. MZ leaders are the main conduit 
between citizens and local government, and are expected to lobby local officials on behalf of 
citizens’ needs and demands.  
2.1 Institutional variation across the two entities 
MZs exist all over Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they function differently on either side of the 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL)3 that divides the country into two entities, RS and FBiH. 
They are legal bodies in the FBiH but do not have legal status in RS. An analysis of the 
relevant legal frameworks reveals important differences in MZ mandates in the two entities. 
The FBiH Law on Principles of Local Self-Governance defines4 the MZ as a structure for sub-
municipal governance, while the RS Law on Local Self-Governance5 does not mention sub-
municipal self-governance at all, but rather mentions MZs as the main form of direct citizen 
participation in local decision-making processes. Based on this distinction, MZs in the FBiH 
have the status of a legal body, while in the RS they are an optional form of citizen 
organisation.6 This affects the way in which MZs are established in each entity. In FBiH they 
are obligatory and are established by the municipal council’s decision. In RS they are 
optional and need to be registered with the municipality if their establishment is considered to 
be in the interest of the population in the municipality.7   
Legal provisions in FBiH demand mandatory consultation with MZs by municipal bodies on 
all issues on which the municipal council decides by the two-third vote, on all municipal 
planning documents, and on other issues where MZ position is needed as per request of the 
municipal council or the mayor.8 Such mandatory provisions do not exist in RS and 
consultation with them on municipal matters is optional. MZs are financed by allocations in 
municipal budgets in both entities, and they can collect contributions, donations and gifts 
from the community. Their legal status leads to some differences. In FBiH they enjoy a 
certain level of financial autonomy, including the possibility of raising their own income by 
selling services, opening tender procedures, maintaining their own bank accounts, signing 
                                                          
2  In both entities there is usually a dedicated local municipal department or officer to manage the relationship with the 
local MZs. This department provides assistance, administrative support and some funds through a dedicated budget 
line. 
3  The coordinates of the IEBL were defined in the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) which was concluded in 1995 to 
cease the three-year-long war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The primary purpose of the DPA was to stop the military 
conflict and create preconditions for peacebuilding. The IEBL was drawn along the military front lines as they stood 
when the negotiations started. It divided 48 out of 109 municipalities into two and, in some cases, the line cut across 
residential areas in towns. According to experts that were interviewed as part of this study, the division of the country 
was based primarily on military front lines at the end of the war, rather than carefully drawn around ethnic groups and 
communities. The consequent ethnic and cultural homogenisation within each entity that we witnessed in each of our 
case municipalities followed later, after the construction of the IEBL. Today, the IEBL marks a deep ethnic division, and 
the entities’ legal frameworks provide for two different governance systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
4  ‘Law on the Principles of Local Self-governance in FBiH’, Official Gazette of FBiH no. 49/06. 
5  ‘Law on Local Self-governance’, Official Gazette of Republika Srpska, nos.101/04, 42/05, 118/05, 98/13. 
6  It is important to stress that the MZ position was compared in the two entities, not in Brčko District where MZs are 
governed by the separate Law on local self-governance. 
7  MZs are generally established for one or more linked settlements or for part of a bigger settlement, and come into being 
when proposed either by 10 per cent of the residents, or by the municipal mayor or a third of municipal councillors. 
8  ‘Law on the Principles of Local Self-governance in FBiH’. 
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contracts, establishing and running businesses, owning and managing property, including 
renting any premises that they own. In contrast, MZs in the RS have to run all their activities 
through the municipal administration and cannot charge for services. 
 
Table 2.1 Difference between MZs in the two entities 
 
 FBiH RS 
Establishment Obligatory Optional 
Financial autonomy 
Financially autonomous and can raise 
own income 
Dependent on municipal 
administration and cannot raise own 
income 
Municipal obligation to 
consult with MZs 
Mandatory consultation by 
municipality in decision-making 
No such mandatory inclusion 
Tenure Greater security of tenure Can be dismissed by municipality 
 
There are two possible reasons for the different status of MZs in the two entities of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. First, new laws on local self-governance were designed in both entities in 
2004. According to the previous laws, in operation since 1995, MZs had the status of legal 
bodies in local self-governance in both entities. As traditional structures from the old 
Yugoslav regime, MZs were led by older people, almost always men, and by political party 
members. Under the newer laws designed with guidance from the Council of Europe, there 
was a push to make MZs optional informal structures with more representative leadership, 
within which citizens could come together around spatial interests. The RS adopted this 
approach in the new law on local self-governance that it passed a year later in 2005. FBiH 
did not adopt its law until 2006 and, according to respondents, learned from issues emerging 
in the RS during this time to introduce several improvements, including retaining the legal 
status of MZs as bodies of sub-municipal governance.  
The political context of each entity provides a second possible reason for the different status 
of MZs on either side of the IEBL. We pieced together evidence on the impact of politics on 
these decisions through interviews with some scholars and local sources. According to these, 
in the period before 2004 MZs were believed to anchor the long-ruling Serb Democratic 
Party’s (SDS) constituency in RS, and were staffed with ruling party members and 
supporters. In the post-war years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, funds for reconstruction and 
the return of displaced persons were often channelled through MZs, which had financial 
autonomy and could receive and manage funds for projects. These funds were allegedly 
often used to mobilise voters during local and general elections. The opposition  the Alliance 
of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)  believed that this support base, anchored in 
MZs, kept the SDS in power. They, therefore, pushed for the ‘neutralisation’ of these bodies 
as part of the redesign of the local government system in 2004, and were backed in this 
demand by the Council of Europe.9 In the FBiH, the political climate was different, and there 
was no similar strong political interest to weaken MZs. Part of the reason for this is that FBiH 
is more decentralised than RS, with an added cantonal level that lies between the entity and 
municipalities, and which requires power-sharing across the ten cantons.10 Local politics thus 
have a less consolidated impact on entity-level politics in FBiH, and MZs are not perceived to 
be as much of a threat as in RS.  
                                                          
9  This seems to have worked, given that SNSD has been in power since 2006. 
10  As Efendic et al. (2011) explain, ‘every canton has its own government, parliament, and jurisdictions related to, for 
example, education, health-care services, police and courts. Hence, FBiH has de facto eleven governments inside one 
entity. The RS is much more centralised, with only a municipality level’, and FBiH has more ‘complex and overlapping 
government, administrative, and institutional arrangements’ (Efendic et al. 2011: 525 and 537). FBiH also has a stronger 
power-sharing arrangement between Bosniac and Croat political parties and, therefore, a less consolidated opposition. 
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3 Research design and methodology 
We use the institutional difference in the status of MZs across Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two 
entities to develop a comparative study. Our main concern here is whether the formal legal 
status of local institutions is correlated with levels of participation in state decision-making 
processes, and whether this is correlated with improved service delivery. We hypothesise a 
causal mechanism that: formal status and the greater integration of local institutions into local 
government leads to greater levels of citizen participation because citizens come to see 
these as viable and effective ways to access the state; the formal status means that 
members of these local institutions are included in local government decision-making 
meetings, and the higher community participation leads to greater pressure on these 
institutions to represent citizen voice in state processes; and this in turn increases pressure 
for a state response, which may eventually lead to an improvement in the provision and 
quality of public services. We are, therefore, looking for two types of associations: one 
between formal legal status and levels of participation, and the other between participation 
and the level and quality of service delivery. 
We use a mixed methods approach to answer the main research question set out in this 
study. Our main rationale for this is to expand the explanatory power of our main variables by 
combining generalisable results from household surveys with details on how the legal status 
and role of MZs impacts local participation and the provision of public services in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. We collected primary data for this study in two main ways: (a) through a set of 
semi-structured interviews with municipal staff and MZ leaders; and (b) through household 
surveys in four municipalities, two on either side of the IEBL, that focused on service delivery 
and on participation. In addition, we reviewed a number of secondary sources and relevant 
municipal documents, including MZ statutes and decisions, and recently published reports on 
MZs. We also conducted some informal interviews with scholars and experts to provide 
details on context. 
3.1 Case and sample selection 
In order to exploit the fact that MZs have legal status in FBiH and not in the RS, we chose 
two municipalities on either side of the IEBL as our case studies  four municipalities in all. 
The four municipalities are contiguous except in the case of one that lies at a short distance. 
Despite their proximity to one another, the IEBL provides an institutional and political 
separation between these municipalities. This research design allows us to analyse the role 
of the same institution, the MZ, operating under two different institutional frameworks  one 
that provides it with legal status, and the other that does not.  
We wanted municipalities that were immediate neighbours but lay on either side of the 
border, were of comparable size in terms of population (neither too small nor too large), and 
had a similar mix of rural and urban MZs, which immediately excluded all municipalities that 
were entirely rural or were large cities. We shortlisted municipalities that were mid-sized and 
had a mix of rural and urban MZs. From within these we selected those that lay on the IEBL, 
and neighboured one another on either side of this border. A few additional criteria were also 
applied, such as the size of the territory under the municipalities’ control, a comparable 
number of MZs, similarly homogenous ethnic compositions and general political stability. This 
gave us municipalities F111 and F2 in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and 
municipalities R3 and R4 in the Republika Srpska (RS). All the information collected through 
secondary sources and desk reviews was verified through a first round of field visits. 
                                                          
11  These notational names are used to anonymise our municipalities. 
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Table 3.1 Basic information about selected municipalities 
Entity FBiH RS 
Municipality F1 F2 R3 R4 
Population 41,836 48,395 27,799 19,041 
Size of territory 210 km2 219.5 km2 363 km2 184 km2 
Number of MZs 36 23 24 25 
Ethnic composition 92% Bosniacs 
3% Croats 
1% Serbs 
4% others 
97% Bosniacs 
0.33% Croats 
0.56% Serbs 
2%others 
77% Serbs 
18% Bosniacs 
4% Croats 
1% Roma 
93% Serbs 
3% Bosniacs 
3% Croats 
1% others 
Source: Official municipal estimates. 
Then we randomly selected three MZs in each municipality to work in, maintaining one urban 
and two rural MZs in each case. This necessitated the non-random inclusion of the urban 
MZs in F2 and R4 since these were the only urban MZs in each municipality. In addition, in 
F2 the municipality suggested that an additional rural MZ be added because of its vicinity to 
the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. In the end there were 13 MZs included in the study. We also 
ensured that the rural MZs were not too close to urban towns in order to avoid spillover 
effects from access to urban services. In each MZ we conducted household surveys for 
which between 15 and 35 households were randomly selected in each MZ, in proportion to 
the population of the community. A total of 265 households were surveyed in November and 
December 2014 128 households in RS and 137 in FBiH.  
During the initial scoping interviews, we asked municipalities to identify services that they 
provide and that are in high demand, had registered some change in the last few years and 
had potential for further improvement. Interestingly, each municipality suggested communal 
services  either water supply or waste management. We then designed household surveys 
with a series of questions about the provision and quality of these services, as well as 
questions about households’ engagement with both MZs and local governments. We 
collected additional primary data through semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions with municipal and MZ staff. Three meetings were conducted in each 
municipality, and in total nine municipal staff and 20 MZ leaders were interviewed.  
3.2 Estimation technique 
We estimate four econometric models in this paper. The first tests for an association 
between the legal status of MZs and levels of participation. We use a binomial logit 
regression model with a dichotomous dependent variable, ‘MZpart’, that is a proxy measure 
for household-level participation, based on the particularities of the way in which people 
approach MZs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (explained in greater detail in Section 4.1). It is 
coded 0 for no participation, and 1 for participation in MZs. The second model examines 
correlations between participation in MZs and the quality of service provision. Since our 
measure for the quality, frequency and transparency of delivery uses a 3-point Likert scale (1 
for low satisfaction and 3 for high satisfaction), we used an ordered logistic model, which is a 
statistical technique used for predicting dependent variables that are ordinal measurements 
(McCullagh 1980). We use these two techniques to run two further estimations of the 
association between the number of municipal councillors in a community and (a) participation 
in MZs, and (b) satisfaction with the quality of services. 
Across the models, the three main independent variables used are: (a) the entity that each 
respondent lives in, as an indicator of the legal status of MZs (formal in FBiH (=1) and 
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informal in RS (=0)); (b) whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area (urban=1 and 
rural=0); and (c) the number of municipal councillors in a community, which is a continuous 
variable that ranges from 0 to 9 in our sample communities. We also construct an interaction 
variable for entity and urban residence, called ‘UrbE’. We use the socioeconomic status of 
the head of our respondent households as control variables. We include gender as a dummy 
variable (female=1), and age of the head of the household was expressed as a categorical 
variable that takes on three values: 1 (1835 years), 2 (3550 years) and 3 (over 50 years). 
We also include six dummy variables for education, ranging from 1 (Never enrolled in school) 
to 6 (Postgraduate). We include municipality dummies to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the municipality level. All results are presented in terms of marginal effects, 
which measure the magnitude of the impact of a one-unit change in an independent variable 
on the dependent variable in a regression model, holding all other variables constant. For the 
dichotomous variables in our regressions, a marginal effect can be understood as the 
change in probability of going from 0 to 1. 
 
4 Results and discussion 
The main question we ask in this paper is whether more formal legal status of local informal, 
or semi-formal, institutions matters for citizen participation and for local service delivery. 
Overall, we found strong associations between where people live, and the extent to which 
they participate in MZs and the type of services they receive. First, we found that both the 
entity that our respondents live in  FBiH or RS  and whether they live in an urban or rural 
area has a strong correlation with the extent to which they participate in MZs. Those that live 
in FBiH and in rural areas participate more in MZs. Is this correlated with the type or quality 
of service that they receive? We found no significant difference across entities in the extent 
of service provision, but there are significant differences in the type and quality of service that 
they receive. People in FBiH receive more public services  compared to largely private 
delivery in RS  and are generally more satisfied with the quality of the service. Most 
importantly, we found that those in rural areas in both entities receive services largely as a 
result of MZ initiatives, and not because local government delivers municipal services 
universally across all communities.  
We combine our qualitative evidence with these findings from our quantitative data to take a 
detailed look at the role that MZs play under both institutional frameworks, and to attempt an 
initial explanation of the relationship that may exist between the formal status of these local 
institutions and better service quality. Our evidence reveals that MZs play a role in: (a) 
providing channels for citizen participation and the dissemination of information; (b) service 
provision; and (c) representation of citizen interests. We look at each of these in turn below.  
4.1 Citizen participation in local decision-making 
In order to answer our main research question, our first step is to check for whether or not 
there is any association between more formal status and levels of participation, both in MZs 
and through them in local government decision-making processes.  
It is difficult to get a precise measure of participation in MZs. We asked our household 
respondents how often they attend meetings, but this does not provide an effective measure. 
Attendance in MZ meetings is low in general. About 61 per cent of our survey respondents in 
RS and 39 per cent in FBiH reported that they never attended an MZ meeting. Though 
participation in FBiH is higher, only 10 per cent of our sample attend an MZ meeting each 
month, while 15 per cent do so only once in four years for the MZ elections. Others indicated 
varying attendance levels between these two extremes. This does not, however, mean that 
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people do not need or access MZs. We spoke to a number of MZ presidents who explained 
that their interaction with citizens is direct and frequent, but largely ad hoc and outside 
institutionalised channels. Instead of attending regular meetings, people contact MZ 
presidents and council members in the community directly and whenever required, at varying 
locations and at different times, as individuals or as groups, depending on the issue. Quite 
often community members will simply arrive at the president’s house to inquire about issues 
and point out problems, to the extent that some presidents have had to employ secretaries to 
manage the flow. We, therefore, need to construct a measure of participation in MZs by 
community members that better captures this reality.  
To do so we use the information that much of the direct and indirect interaction between the 
community and MZs is about accessing local government to resolve a variety of issues, or to 
demand certain services and facilities. We, therefore, use a question from our survey that 
asked households to identify the way in which they access local government officials to 
construct a measure of participation in MZs. Possible responses include two main options  
(a) people can either contact local government directly through officials, councillors, public 
meetings or letters, or (b) they can go through their MZ presidents and members. This gives 
us a better measure of the extent to which our respondents actually use MZs to participate in 
local government processes.  
Overall, a majority of our respondents contact local government officials directly, either 
through municipal councillors or by visiting the local government offices, or writing a letter to 
the municipality (Table 4.1). However, a quarter of our respondents access local government 
through MZ presidents or other members.  
 
Table 4.1 Accessing local government 
Is it easy for you to meet with local government officials as an individual? (%) 
Yes 38 
No 43 
Do not know 19 
What are the main ways in which you do this? (%) 
Contact directly 22 
Send letter 10 
Contact through councillor 9 
Contact through MZ 25 
Public meeting 2 
Do not know/Other 32 
 
 
Using logistic regressions, we found that there are significant differences across the two 
entities in how local communities access the state. Residents in FBiH are about 32 per cent 
more likely to access local government through MZs as compared to their neighbours across 
the border in RS, controlling for characteristics such as gender, age, education and 
residence in an urban or rural area (see Table 4.2). Similarly, residents of rural parts of a 
municipality are 27 per cent more likely to access the state through an MZ than urban 
residents of the municipality, controlling for respondent characteristics and the entity in which 
they live. Our results are clustered at the community level, and use municipality fixed effects 
to control for unobserved differences across our four sample municipalities. We find that the 
effects of both the entity and rural residence on how citizens access the state is not affected 
by including their interaction in the estimation. This shows that the correlations of living in 
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FBiH and in a rural part of the municipality with participation are significant on their own, and 
not driven by their overlap. 
 
Table 4.2 Effect on participation in MZs 
(Logit estimates/Marginal effects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Entities 0.286*** 0.281*** 0.247** 0.194** 0.315*** 
 (3.19) (3.87) (2.55) (2.38) (3.70) 
      
Urban  -0.150** -0.261*** -0.310*** -0.270*** 
  (-2.00) (-4.60) (-5.31) (-4.84) 
      
UrbanE   0.141 0.195* 0.164 
   (1.30) (1.95) (1.35) 
N 256 256 256 249 249 
Controls No No No Yes Yes 
Municipality 
dummies 
No No No No Yes 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the community level 
 
This finding indicates a possible correlation between participation in MZs and the formal 
status of these local institutions in FBiH, and their informality in RS. In other words, it is 
possible that since MZs are considered the lowest level of municipal governance in FBiH, 
residents, particular those in rural areas, utilise these more for immediate access to local 
government, while in RS, where the municipality rather than the MZ is the lowest level of 
formal governance, citizens may see little point in working through MZs. 
Descriptive results for three other survey questions reveal a little more about community 
participation in local government processes in the two entities. A majority of households on 
either side of the border do not think they can contribute to decision-making on communal 
services like water and waste collection in local government. However, about a third on both 
sides believe that they can contribute  with people in FBiH having marginally greater belief 
in their ability to do so than those in the RS  and, of these, over 90 per cent of respondents 
in both entities believe that they are able to contribute through MZs and not directly. 
Furthermore, a significant number of all our respondents  39 per cent in FBiH and 28 per 
cent in RS  believe that their participation in local decision-making can lead to an 
improvement in service delivery (Table 4.3). 
MZs are not used by everyone, but there is some evidence that they play a part in making 
local communities feel more empowered vis-à-vis local government, and create a sense, to 
an extent, of being able to contribute to local decision-making. This sense seems to be 
marginally higher in FBiH than in RS, which may be correlated with the greater distance that 
exists between communities in RS and the lowest tier of the state. In a sense, then, bringing 
government closer to the people in the form of the formalisation of organic local institutions 
may actually matter to citizen participation in local decision-making. 
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Table 4.3 Participation in local government processes 
 FBiH RS 
Are you able to contribute to decision-making in local government? (%) 
Yes  37  30 
No  63  70 
If yes: 
Directly  10  6 
Through MZs  90  94 
Can your participation lead to improvement in services? 
Yes  39  28 
No  24  43 
Don’t know  37  29 
 
This is borne out by our interviews with municipal officials and MZ members who pointed out 
the active role that MZs play in terms of connecting citizens with the state by providing 
channels for regular contact and for the dissemination of information. MZs participate 
regularly in meetings with municipalities and with public utilities on issues of communal 
infrastructure, housing, health and social protection, civil protection and disaster 
management, environmental protection, education and culture. They are also central to 
communication between the local government and residents, and with public companies, 
which use MZs regularly as important channels for conveying messages to their users about 
changes in services. MZs maintain information boards that are commonly used by both 
service providers and communities for updates and information on services. While in urban 
areas municipalities and utility companies have started using local radio stations and 
maintain websites to disseminate information, many rural residents do not have good access 
to either and rely heavily on MZs for access to information. 
4.2 Service provision  extent, type and quality 
 
We know now that MZs may bring local government closer to people, especially in the rural 
parts of both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, we do not know whether this has 
any positive correlation with the extent, type or quality of service provision. We check for this 
now.  
We found that neither the entity  that is, whether MZs have formal status or not  nor the 
extent of participation in MZs makes a difference to the overall extent of service provision on 
either side of the entity border. This is mainly because there is little variation in service 
provision across our 13 communities in the provision of water and waste collection services 
(Table 4.4). Each of our sample communities has access to at least one, if not both, of these 
services. Overall provision, therefore, provides us with no significant variation.  
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Table 4.4 Provision of water and waste services 
 
Entity Municipality MZs 
Provision of water service Provision of waste service 
Managing body (utility) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FBiH 
F1 
1 – Urban Municipality (public) Municipality (public) 
2 – Rural  MZ (public) Municipality (public) 
3 – Rural MZ Municipality (public) 
F2 
4 – Urban Municipality (public) Municipality (public) 
5 – Rural     MZ MZ (private) 
6 – Rural MZ MZ (public) 
7 – Rural MZ MZ (public) 
 
 
 
 
RS 
R3 
8 – Urban Municipality (private) Municipality (private) 
9 – Rural MZ (private) MZ (private) 
10 – Rural MZ (private) MZ (private) 
R4 
11 – Urban Municipality (private) Municipality (private) 
12– Rural No provision MZ (private) 
13 – Rural No provision MZ (private) 
There are, however, differences in how these services are provided. Both water and waste 
collection can be provided either by a public utility, or their provision can be contracted 
through private utility companies. A further distinction relates to whether the provision is 
arranged and managed by the municipality, or by MZs and citizens themselves. We found an 
interesting variation in this across the entities, and across urban and rural areas. In all four of 
the urban communities in our sample  one in each of our four municipalities  the services 
are managed by the municipality directly (Table 4.4). However, these are provided by a public 
utility in FBiH and a private company in RS. In the rest of our sample communities, all of 
which are rural, these services are arranged by MZs  with the exception of waste collection 
in municipality F1 in FBiH, where the municipality manages and provides services, and water 
provision in R4 in RS, where there is no service provision and the community is served by 
local wells.  
The MZ in each community may organise the service differently. For example, waste 
management in the three rural communities in municipality F2 has different delivery 
arrangements. In one of these the MZ contracted a private company without any involvement 
of or support from the municipal office. In the two other communities, the MZs sent a written 
request to the public utility that services the urban area to make arrangements for waste 
collection. Once this was organised, households then concluded individual contracts with the 
public company. In F1, the MZs manage the local water supply to their community on their 
own, and in one case even set up their own utility company for water supply from the 
neighbouring municipality. In RS, on the other hand, the municipalities in urban areas and 
MZs in rural areas contract directly with private companies to organise services.  
These facts about service provision connect well to our earlier finding about greater 
participation in MZs in rural areas. Public provision covers urban parts of a municipality and 
urban residents may have little need to communicate with local institutions like MZs. Instead 
they can directly contact the water and waste collection utilities, fire brigades, health centres 
and hospitals, and other municipal offices. In rural areas, there is less public provision and 
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greater distances to cover to get to a government office. MZs step into this space to take on 
a proactive role in ensuring that arrangements are contracted between public or private 
companies and individual households within their communities. And this may explain rural 
residents’ greater use of these fora.  
How do these different arrangements correlate with user satisfaction with these services? We 
test for this by using three Likert scale-based variables on household satisfaction with: (a) the 
quality of the service provided, (b) the frequency with which it is provided, and (c) the extent 
of transparency in its billing and management. Using ordered logistic regressions, we found 
that where people live is a significant predictor of how satisfied they are with the quality, 
frequency and transparency of water provision, but not necessarily of waste collection. 
Table 4.5 shows that as far as water provision is concerned, satisfaction is higher across all 
indicators in FBiH  residents are 37 per cent more likely to be satisfied with the quality of 
provision, 18 per cent more likely to be satisfied with the frequency of provision, and 16 per 
cent more likely to be satisfied with the transparency of the service. Rural and urban 
residence does not seem to matter in this case, except when it comes to the transparency of 
service management, which appears to be 17 per cent higher in rural areas. Participation in 
MZs does not matter on the whole, but it is negatively correlated with service frequency, 
which means that people participate more where service is less frequent. As one president of 
an MZ council in FBiH explained, ‘MZ is an institution that becomes visible when citizens 
need it. When there is no need, it becomes invisible’.  
As far as waste collection is concerned, the results are weaker and there seems to be little 
significant difference across our sample units. There is about 8 per cent higher satisfaction 
with the frequency of the service in RS, and about the same with the quality of the service in 
urban areas. The reason for this difference across services is unclear, but there is a 
possibility that this may be connected to the more intense overall involvement of MZs in 
organising water services  and the greater engagement between service 
providers/managers and users  as compared to their role in waste provision, where they 
simply organise household contracts with the utility companies.  
 
Table 4.5 Effect on service quality 
(Ordered logit estimates/marginal effects) 
 
 Water Waste 
 (Quality) (Frequency) (Transparency) (Quality) (Frequency) (Transparency) 
MZpart 0.005 -0.031* -0.014 0.013 0.017 0.013 
 (0.08) (-1.86) (-0.32) (0.30) (0.57) (0.36) 
       
Entities 0.369*** 0.181*** 0.157* 0.002 -0.076* -0.038 
 (4.80) (2.89) (1.86) (0.06) (-1.68) (-0.63) 
       
Urban 0.064 -0.031 -0.170** 0.082* 0.042 0.050 
 (0.71) (-0.90) (-2.10) (1.71) (1.50) (1.13) 
N 112 112 111 190 193 187 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the community level 
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4.2.1 Formal status and informal service provision 
As demonstrated in Table 4.4, MZs play a major role in the initiation, organisation and 
management of water and waste services in the rural communities in our sample. Some do 
this by negotiating with the municipality, others do so by entering into agreements with 
private companies, while yet others have established their own public utilities. Municipal 
representatives in at least three of our four municipalities laid great emphasis on MZs’ 
significant contributions to improvements in service provision in both urban and rural MZs by 
acting as interest and pressure groups. Senior municipal officials explained how capital 
investments in municipalities were increasing each year, and that much of this was the result 
of the bottom-up pressure from MZs as ‘umbrella organisations’ for community actions.  
Interestingly, MZs play this role in both entities, regardless of their legal status. This is 
because many of the roles they take on fall outside their formally mandated roles, even in 
FBiH where their remit is more expansive. Many of our respondents believe that were it not 
for the efforts of local MZs, rural communities would remain without any public services. 
However, in both entities service provision is not formally delegated to MZs under local 
government statutes. The only MZ function defined in sufficient detail in the law has to do 
with their facilitation of citizen participation. Citizens are expected to approach MZ boards to 
express their needs, and MZs are then meant to arrange solutions through either the 
municipality or private companies. In FBiH they can run tender procedures for utility 
companies but without getting involved in service provision themselves. Once services are in 
place, MZs are meant to receive and transmit complaints from users about problems and 
poor services. The fact that in some cases MZs have actually taken on a larger role in 
service provision in both entities  such as, raising funds to construct a water supply system, 
choosing a construction company to execute the work, and then managing the system on a 
daily basis  is a role that they take on to meet community demand in an entirely informal, 
and sometimes even illegal, capacity. In one such case that we recorded in FBiH, both 
municipal officials and MZ leaders were unsure of the local utility’s legality, despite the fact 
that the utility was operating on a daily basis, had an active Steering Board, and its 
registration had been approved by the municipality itself.  
4.3 Representation and local politics 
 
Our evidence shows that MZs play an important role in the representation of local interests 
and demands. However, communities are also represented formally on municipal councils by 
local councillors who are elected during municipal elections. There is no stipulated number of 
councillors for each community, and those in our sample have between 0 and 9 
representatives on the municipal council. It is possible that communities that are better 
represented on the municipal council may receive better services, without this having too 
much to do with the role of MZs, and that in such communities MZs have a less prominent 
role to play in service provision.  
We tested for such an association and found that the number of councillors is not correlated 
with the quality indicators for waste collection, but that there is a correlation with the quality 
indicators for water services and with participation in MZs. A higher number of councillors 
predicts marginally higher satisfaction with the frequency and transparency of water services, 
controlling for entity, urban residence and respondent characteristics. It is negatively 
associated with the actual quality of water by a similarly small margin. We do not have 
evidence to explain why this is, and it merits further exploration in future research.  
Our respondents confirmed that better representation on the municipal council could mean 
better service provision. As one MZ council president in FBiH explained, ‘this increases the 
chances of getting projects and carrying out more successful initiatives. We do not have a 
councillor, so while it is easy for us to solve small things, it is very difficult to resolve bigger 
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projects like sewage, water supply, sports fields, etc.’. MZs that do have community members 
on municipal councils said that they use this to put issues on the municipal agenda and have 
successfully implemented a number of community projects in cooperation with their 
municipal government.  
As for participation in MZs, we found that the number of councillors has a significant negative 
correlation with participation in MZs (Table 4.6). For each unit change in the number of 
councillors, our respondents are about 4 per cent less likely to participate in MZs to access 
the state, controlling for the residence, age, gender and education of the respondent. In other 
words, MZs may be more relevant where formal representatives are not present. Where they 
are present, they may provide a readier and more direct access to municipal offices. Our 
interviews once again confirmed the slightly competitive, and sometimes even non-
cooperative, relationship between MZs and local councillors. One MZ leader explained how 
many bottom-up initiatives for improved communication and coordination between local 
officials and MZs failed because of the strong opposition of local councillors. This, our 
respondents explained, is based on deep-seated tensions between local councillors and MZ 
leaders based on their claims to representing the same constituency, and on their ability to 
influence each other’s voters and threaten each other’s authority within the community. In 
fact, this tension between local politicians and MZs is cited as one of the reasons behind the 
decision to make MZs informal in the RS, and why more sub-municipal decentralisation has 
not happened to date on either side of the entity border.  
What is important for our purpose here is the fact that while formal representation of 
communities on municipal councils is variable and dependent on local and party politics, the 
presence and role of MZs is more consistent. Our results show that these local institutions fill 
gaps in political representation by aggregating and representing citizen demands and needs 
within decision-making processes of local government. 
4.4 Pathways and limitations 
Our initial question asked about the correlations between the formal status of MZs, citizen 
participation and service provision. Our results show that both citizen participation in these 
local institutions and satisfaction with some services  water in this case  is higher where 
MZs have formal status. Our qualitative data provide information that allows us to attempt an 
explanation of how this relationship works, and to construct a probable causal pathway that 
leads from the formal inclusion of MZs as a sub-municipal tier of local government through 
higher citizen participation to greater satisfaction with some services. This works as follows.  
A more formal status for MZs within local government can have two effects. First, citizens 
may believe that it is more useful and worthwhile to engage with these local institutions in 
order to gain more immediate access to the state. Second, MZs are invited to sit on more 
decision-making fora and meetings within local government than they would with an informal 
status. We found evidence for both these effects: (a) people in FBiH are more likely to use 
MZs, controlling for a host of other factors, and (b) while municipalities in RS receive MZs in 
much the same capacity that they would receive other citizen interest and pressure groups, 
MZs in FBiH are consulted on planning decisions, may be invited to budgetary meetings, and 
have more ready access to both local executive and legislative officials. This may improve 
their ability to represent citizen interests, which in turn can lead to greater pressure on local 
government officials to deliver more and better services. This too is evident in our data in 
official comments on the extent to which MZs act as pressure groups for local service 
delivery, and their supposed recent impact on new capital investments.   
 
  
 21 
Table 4.6 Effect of councillors on participation in MZ and quality of services 
(Ordered logit estimates/marginal effects) 
 
  Water Waste 
 
(MZ 
participation) 
(Quality) (Frequency) (Transparency) (Quality) (Frequency) (Transparency) 
Councillor -0.043*** -0.038*** 0.022*** 0.020*** -0.021 -0.016 -0.045 
 (-3.77) (-5.56) (3.40) (2.66) (-0.78) (-0.95) (-1.26) 
        
N 249 115 115 114 197 200 194 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the community level 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Limited resources and capacity 
This pathway would work well as an explanation were it not for two realities. First is the fact 
that despite their formal status, MZs in FBiH have fairly limited resources and a lack of 
technical capacity that does not allow them to fully realise their mandated role. Second is the 
fact that municipalities in RS continue to extend enough support to MZs to allow them to 
function in quite similar ways to their counterparts across the border. This suggests that while 
formal status should be able to lead to better service delivery, in reality significant differences 
between the two entities are limited by the absence of clearer mandates, greater capacity, 
and increased resources for MZs in FBiH.   
Many MZ leaders in FBiH pointed out that they have little direct influence on the 
management and quality of services. This is largely because the legal mechanisms for MZs 
to become a regular, integrated part of the local self-governance system are neither fully 
defined nor properly enforced. Their legal status has not led to the decentralisation of some 
communal services from the municipality downwards, despite the fact that there is a legal 
basis for municipalities to transfer jurisdictions and funds to MZs in both entities. MZ 
presidents in FBiH attribute this to a perception by municipal officials that a transfer of 
jurisdiction over some services to MZs will curtail their own power. One of our respondents, a 
municipal official, provided some truth to this by asking, ‘If MZs were given more 
competences, what would the municipality do then?’ 
Their formal status has also not meant better working conditions for MZs in FBiH. They do 
not have their own premises from which to work, and often end up working out of the 
community’s common spaces, they do not have an independent income, and we found that 
presidents of the MZ Councils often invest in their own stationery and equipment to issue 
certificates. The president of one MZ council in RS said that while they expected to work like 
this because of their lack of formal status, they were surprised by the fact that the situation 
was not any different for their counterparts in FBiH. In fact, in one municipality of RS the 
municipal office has ensured that each MZ council has its own premises and each MZ 
president receives a symbolic monthly fee for his/her work. All material expenses in these 
premises are also covered by the municipal budget, as well as the transport costs for the 
presidents of MZ councils to attend municipal council sessions.   
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Despite this, there are indications that both municipal staff and MZ members see advantages 
in the formal status of MZs. Municipal representatives in RS believe that formal status would 
allow them to have financial autonomy by letting them raise their own income and to benefit 
from better planning by being able to hire professional and paid personnel rather than 
volunteers. MZs in FBiH do, indeed, seem to have more resources in some cases because 
they are able to rent out spaces and run businesses. MZ presidents can also hire a technical 
secretary on the payroll by law. Overall, it is interesting to note that those that have 
formalised MZs feel that this makes little real difference to the way they work, while those 
that no longer have legal status believe that this is where the problem lies.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we sought to explore the role of the same local institution, Mjesna Zajednicas, 
operating under two different institutional frameworks  one that provides it with legal status, 
and the other that does not. This research design is made possible by the institutional 
difference that exists across the two entities that lie on either side of the IEBL in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and which provides us with a unique opportunity to analyse the role of the 
same informal local governance institution operating within two different institutional 
frameworks. The main question we asked was whether the legal status and the formal 
inclusion of informal institutions of citizen participation, the MZs, in local government 
processes makes a difference to citizen participation and service delivery?   
Overall, we found that MZs play an important role in citizen participation, in local service 
delivery and in representing citizen demands and interests, especially in rural areas. Though 
they play this role in both entities  coordinating, communicating and facilitating between 
citizens and local governments  we found that there was a significantly higher level of 
citizen participation and user satisfaction with service quality in FBiH, where MZs are formal, 
than in RS, where they are not. 
In a sense then, bringing government closer to the people in the form of the formalisation of 
organic local institutions appears to matter. There appears to be a close relationship between 
the legal formal status of MZs, the higher use of these bodies to access the state, their 
greater participation in local government processes, and more service provision, especially in 
rural areas. However, what is also apparent is that formal status, in and of itself, can do little 
to deal with the issues and challenges of community governance in the absence of clearer 
mandates, greater capacity, and increased resources for local institutions of citizen 
participation.  
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